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After they left, the Titan The submarine was rebuilt with a new hull that was never tested to industry standards or certified by an independent agency. Patrick Lahey, chief executive of submersible manufacturer Triton Submarines, said certifying a new hull was not only possible but essential for safety.
“We were developing and certifying the world’s deepest diving submarine at the same time they were developing this hobbyist contraption,” he testified. “There was absolutely no reason why they couldn’t certify it.”
A story of troubles Titanic Missions
OceanGate’s first missions to the Titanic In 2021 we were beset by problems, including the TitanThe submarine’s forward titanium dome broke off after a dive, troubling readings from the acoustic monitoring system and a propeller that failed at 11,000 feet (3,500 meters) deep. A Coast Guard evidence slide showed 70 equipment problems that required correction from the season’s dives. Things improved slightly the following year, with just 48 problems recorded. But these included dead batteries that extended a mission from about seven to 27 hours, and the submarine itself being damaged during recovery.
In 2022, a dive ended with a mysterious, loud bang and cracking sound as she surfaced. Antonella Wilby, an engineering contractor for OceanGate, was so concerned about the bang that she considered alerting OceanGate’s board of directors. She said another employee warned her that she risked being sued if she did so. “Anyone should feel free to speak up about safety without fear of retaliation, and that’s not at all what I saw,” she said. “I was completely fired.”
In it TitanOn the penultimate dive of 2023, contractor Tym Catterson admitted failing to conduct a safety check; Titan It listed at a 45-degree angle for an hour, crowding those on board.
Conflicting opinions on carbon fiber helmets
There were conflicting testimonies about the safety of the TitanThe carbon-fibre hull is unique. Dyer noted that carbon fibre could be a good choice for deep-sea submersibles, and Nissen was adamant that computer modelling and the acoustic monitoring warning system meant it could be used indefinitely. Lochridge, Catterson and former human resources director Bonnie Carl were far more sceptical about the hull’s design and implementation. But all three acknowledged that they were not engineers.
Next week, testimony by Nissen’s successor, Phil Brooks, more submarine engineers and a Boeing carbon fiber expert should address many of these questions. In particular, testimony next Wednesday by an engineer at the National Transportation Safety Board’s Materials Laboratory on the TitanThe debris may identify the physical cause of the implosion.
Where was the Coast Guard?
At various points, researchers noted that the Titan The ship should have been inspected by the U.S. Coast Guard before carrying paying passengers. None of those questioned could explain why this was not the case, even though OceanGate apparently contacted the Coast Guard on multiple occasions to notify it of its underwater operations.
Lochridge also testified that OSHA told him in 2018 that it had reported his safety complaints to the Coast Guard. At least one of the five U.S. Coast Guard witnesses to be called next week is in Puget Sound, near OceanGate’s headquarters, and could speak about it.
U.S. Coast Guard Rear Adm. John Lockwood, who joined OceanGate’s board in 2013, is not on the witness list. Lochridge and Carl testified that Lockwood’s role was to oversee and facilitate interactions with the Coast Guard.
Missing witnesses
Lockwood is not the only notable absentee from the witness stand. This week, several witnesses testified about the key role of OceanGate employees, including Wendy Rush, Scott Griffith and Neil McCurdy, in making crucial business, regulatory and operational decisions throughout OceanGate’s history and on the day of the accident. None have been called to testify. Neither have any of the helmet manufacturers been called to testify. The Coast Guard has not provided a reason for this, other than to deny that it is because those witnesses would have invoked their Fifth Amendment rights to refuse to answer questions.