Look, what I’ve seen since I came back to the State Department three and a half years ago is that everything that happens in the technological world and in cyberspace is increasingly central to our foreign policy.
In recent years, a kind of perfect storm has formed: several major breakthroughs have brought this topic to the centre of our attention. First, we have a new generation of fundamental technologies that are changing the world literally at the same time, whether it is artificial intelligence, quantum, microelectronics, biotechnology or telecommunications. They are having a profound impact and are increasingly converging and feeding back on each other.
Secondly, we are seeing the line between the digital and physical worlds blurring, erasing. We have cars, ports and hospitals that are, in effect, huge data centers. These are huge vulnerabilities. At the same time, we have increasingly rare materials that are critical to technology and fragile supply chains. In each of these areas, the State Department is taking action.
We have to look at everything in terms of “stacks”: the hardware, the software, the talent, and the norms, the rules, the standards by which this technology is used.
In addition to creating a new Cyber and Digital Policy Office (and the offices are really the pillars of our department), we have trained over 200 cybersecurity and digital officers, people who are really experts. Every one of our embassies around the world will have at least one person who is truly an expert in technology and digital policy. My goal is to make sure that across the department we have basic knowledge (ideally, fluency) and even, eventually, proficiency. All of this to make sure that, as I said, this department is fit for purpose across the information and digital space.
Your tenure here in Foggy Bottom has coincided with what appears to be the fracturing of the dream of a global internet. We have begun to see this fragmentation play out in two realms: a European regulatory network and authoritarian regimes using the internet as a tool of surveillance. We have, of course, seen this play out in US policy on Huawei and TikTok.
Ideally, we would like to see no such fractures, and that would certainly be the preference. We have done a number of things to try to move in another direction: trying to create broad consensus on how technology is used. Let me give you an example on artificial intelligence. The White House has done an incredible job of developing core principles with the founding companies. The State Department has worked to internationalize the voluntary commitments they made. We have a G7 code of conduct where everyone agrees on core principles focused on security.
We succeeded in getting the first resolution on artificial intelligence passed by the United Nations General Assembly, with 192 countries also signing up to the core principles on security and focusing on using AI to advance sustainable development goals on issues such as health, education and climate. We also had more than 50 countries sign up to the core principles on the responsible military use of AI.
The goal is not to create a world divided into two parts, but to try to bring everyone together. That said, you are right: there are areas where we are of course competing intensely with other countries. If we cannot agree on rules that ensure that we are elevating the good and minimising the bad, we need to make sure that we are protecting our values and our interests.
For example, when it comes to cutting-edge technology (e.g., next-generation chips), we want to make sure that a country like China cannot acquire them and then use them directly in its military program. They are currently engaged in a major expansion of their nuclear program (which is very unclear) and it is not in our interest for them to have cutting-edge technology.
